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JOHN HALEY AND THE AMERICAN DISCOVERY 
OF JAPANESE LAW 
J. MARK RAMSEYER∗ 
The exchange takes place in a Moroccan cafe in the year John O. Haley 
was born, 1942. A Bulgarian bride asks the American saloon-keeper: 
“Monsieur Rick, what kind of man is Captain Renault?” He replies: “Oh, 
he’s just like any other man, only more so.”1 
So too Japanese law, in a way. When Haley entered the field in the 
mid-1970s, scholars asked, “What kind of legal system is the Japanese 
legal system?” “Unlike any legal system anywhere in the world,” most 
replied. Not Haley. “Just like any other legal system,” he insisted. “Maybe 
even more so.”  
As adamant as he was unconventional, within three decades Haley had 
transformed the field completely. 
I. PROFESSIONALIZATION 
Haley entered a field that Takeyoshi Kawashima owned. A professor of 
Civil Law at the preeminent University of Tokyo, Kawashima had 
dominated the Japanese legal professoriate for two decades. He had 
trained a generation of post-war scholars. He had placed them in crucial 
teaching positions. He had shaped the way Japanese scholars saw 
contracts, torts, property, and family law.2 He had introduced “law and 
society” scholarship.3  
Through a simple chapter in a 1963 book,4 Kawashima also dominated 
the field of U.S. scholarship on Japanese law. Four decades later, his is a 
chapter many of us still teach. Four decades later, it still captures the 
stereotypes many students bring to the study of Japanese law. Japanese 
 
 
 ∗ Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard University. Prepared for the Law in 
Japan conference in honor of Professor John Owen Haley, held in St. Louis at the Washington 
University School of Law, May 2008. Consider this a personal tribute from one of the conference 
organizers. I received helpful comments and suggestions from Tom Ginsburg and Frank Upham. 
 1. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. 1942). 
 2. See, e.g., TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO HŌISHIKI [THE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF 
THE JAPANESE] (1967). 
 3. Kawashima has been called “the father of the sociology of law in Japan.” Tom Ginsburg, 
Takao Tanase, Japanese Litigiousness, and “Taking Kawashima Seriously” 1 (presentation from the 
2005 Sho Sato Conference in Honor of Takao Tanase, Feb. 12–13, 2005). 
 4. Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE 
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41, 41 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963). See also 
YOSHIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW (Anthony H. Angelo ed. & trans., 1976) (1966). 
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ignore the law because its rules are un-Japanese, students insist. They 
avoid the courts because the universalistic legal rules do not fit 
hierarchical Japan, Kawashima more prolixly explained.5 They hate 
lawyers because they hate litigation. And they hate litigation because it 
threatens the non-confrontational character of the Japanese psyche.6 
Within Japan, Kawashima soon expanded the chapter into a bestselling 
paperback.7 Given his professional position, the book carried a patina of 
intellectual respectability. And given the 1970s-era fascination with 
theories about “the Japanese national character,” it found a natural mass 
audience. It was scholarship-lite, a read-it-standing-in-the-subway 
paperback for a country that still devoured paperback nonfiction. 
It was in The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant (“The Reluctant Litigant”) 
that Haley confronted Kawashima directly,8 of course, but another article 
of much the same vintage had a possibly-just-as-corrosive effect. 
Marketing and Antitrust in Japan9 (“Marketing and Antitrust”) does not 
mention Kawashima. It does not discuss sociology. It has less of the 
intellectual ambition that would soon characterize Haley’s work. As befits 
a modest piece, it is less cited, less often remembered, and largely not 
taught. Arguably, however, it weakened Kawashima’s hold on the 
professorial imagination as fundamentally as anything in The Reluctant 
Litigant.  
Marketing and Antitrust attacked Kawashima by sheer force of 
example. The key lies not in what Haley said in the article, but in how he 
justified what he said. In Marketing and Antitrust, he produced an article 
that in a U.S. legal field might have seemed methodologically 
conventional. He found dozens of cases. He read them. He cited them. 
And he wove a story through them about the path of the law.  
In other words, Haley used court cases to locate legal rules, and then 
treated those rules as important. By his very research method, he claimed 
that law mattered. Contrary to everything in Kawashima’s work, Haley 
implied that law shaped the way people behaved, and that court opinions 
disclosed the scope of the law. The Japanese legal system, he declared by 
example, was just like any other legal system. 
 
 
 5. Kawashima, supra note 4, at 43. 
 6. Id. at 44. 
 7. See generally KAWASHIMA, supra note 2. 
 8. John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359, 361–62 
(1978). 
 9. John O. Haley, Marketing and Antitrust in Japan, 2 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51 
(1979). 
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Times change. Three decades later, it is hard to explain how 
revolutionary—how profoundly liberating—so straightforwardly doctrinal 
an article as Marketing and Antitrust could have been in 1979. Yet we owe 
the change to Haley himself. Even if we do “law and” work, we now 
recognize that we cannot say much that is intelligent without knowing the 
underlying legal doctrine.  
That was not always so. In Kawashima’s crudely reductionist world, 
American scholars of Japanese law did not need to learn the law. After all, 
legal rules made no difference. Unintentionally (we can only hope), 
Kawashima had created a field that celebrated the amateur. We did not 
need to be able to read court opinions. After all, litigation and courts did 
not matter. We did not even need to be able to read the Civil Code. After 
all, statutes did not matter either.  
In the field Kawashima had created, American scholars needed only to 
think great thoughts. It helped to have an eloquent but tipsy Tokyo dinner 
partner. It helped to have a garrulous taxi driver and an eager-to-please 
interpreter. But find an “informant” or two, and any speculation about law 
in Japan was fair game. The only expertise required—as Chalmers 
Johnson is said to have said in another context—was to have flown over 
the country in daylight.  
Haley changed all this. Before he began his career, no Western scholar 
wrote articles that took Japanese case law seriously. Certainly Dan 
Henderson did not write in that vein. Michael Young had not yet published 
his article on land-use regulation.10 Contemporaneously with Haley, Frank 
Upham did indeed examine Japanese case law. His careful and thoughtful 
study of Japanese environmental case law is a tour de force.11 Crucially, 
however, we owe the professionalism that characterizes our field today to 
Haley and Upham—and no others. 
II. THE HALEY OEUVRE 
A. Introduction 
The best scholars are like roofers, Richard Epstein once explained over 
lunch. They start laying shingles on one part of the roof. They lay each 
shingle so that it overlaps another. And by the time they break for coffee, 
 
 
 10. Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally 
Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 923 (1984). 
 11. Frank K. Upham, After Minamata: Current Prospects and Problems in Japanese 
Environmental Litigation, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213 (1979). 
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they have moved to an entirely different part of the roof from where they 
started.  
Haley’s work has spanned nearly the entire range of Japanese law. He 
did so much as the Epsteinian roofer did. He started in antitrust. And for 
those of us with an abiding interest in antitrust law, he has continued to 
offer insight and provoke thought. As editor of the field journal, Law in 
Japan, he organized a symposium on the field in the early 1980s.12 He 
published additional careful studies in 1978, 1984, 1991, 1995, and 
1998.13 In 2001, he published a pathbreaking antitrust book with the 
University of Washington Press.14 But he did not let the book stop him. By 
2002 and 2004, he had resumed his antitrust articles.15 
This corpus alone would constitute a respectable output, and had Haley 
done nothing else, he would still be the leading Western interpreter of 
Japanese antitrust. And yet for him, it was just the start. From this 
beginning in antitrust, he developed ideas that would form the basis for 
crucially important contributions in a variety of areas of Japanese law.  
B. Litigation and Settlement 
Of Haley’s many forays, consider three: litigation and settlement, 
bureaucrats, and victim-offender reconciliation efforts. This tribute is 
personal; no doubt others would pick different areas of the law. But return 
first to antitrust. Antitrust litigation is expensive. Only rarely did Japanese 
file private antitrust suits, and the reasons were straightforward: it would 
cost them a fortune, it would take years, and they would probably lose 
anyway. “Might not a similar logic explain a broader class of cases?” 
asked Haley. 
 
 
 12. This symposium was memorialized in volume 15 of Law in Japan (1982). 
 13. See John Owen Haley, Antitrust in Japan: Problems of Enforcement, in CURRENT LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA, 121 (John Owen Haley ed., 1978); John O. 
Haley, Antitrust Sanctions and Remedies: A Comparative Study of German and Japanese Law, 59 
WASH. L. REV. 471 (1984); John O. Haley, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement: Implications for United 
States Trade, 18 N. KY. L. REV. 335 (1991); John O. Haley, Competition and Trade Policy: Antitrust 
Enforcement: Do Differences Matter?, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 303 (1995); John O. Haley, Culture, 
Competition and Deregulation: Japan’s Challenge to International Harmonization of Competition 
Law, in COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW: APPROACHING AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF 
ANTITRUST LAW 93 (Hanns Ullrich ed., 1998) (proceedings of the workshop, College of Europe, 
Bruges, Belg., July 3–5, 1997).  
 14. JOHN O. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS, 1947–1998 
(2001). 
 15. See John O. Haley, Competition Law for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Community: Designing Shoes for Many Sizes, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1 (2002); John O. 
Haley, Competition Policy for East Asia, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 277 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/4
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The Reluctant Litigant grew out of this concern over the cost of 
litigation. Even outside of antitrust, litigation was not free. Litigants 
needed to find a lawyer, but lawyers were few. This was not the result of 
any social hostility toward them, Haley noted.16 They were few because 
the government flunked virtually everyone who applied.17 Litigants also 
needed to devote time to the process, but time is money and litigation 
could take years. Perhaps litigation was rare, Haley suggested, simply 
because it cost money and took time.18  
The debate Haley started with The Reluctant Litigant generated a large 
and increasingly sophisticated literature.19 In the ensuing years, the 
problem continued to attract his attention. Recently, he summarized the 
field consensus: 
 Japanese prefer to resolve disputes in the manner that they 
perceive will maximize their interests or that they believe will best 
realize their personal, self-regarding goals. Litigation . . . will thus 
be avoided whenever thought to be a more costly, more time-
consuming or less effective means to achieve a favorable result . . . .  
 Potential litigants negotiate and settle frequently-litigated 
disputes in the “shadow” of the law. . . .  
 By enhancing the predictability of litigated outcomes, Japanese 
judges promote negotiated settlements that conform to litigated 
outcomes . . . thereby indirectly but efficiently enforcing legal 
rules.20 
C. Bureaucrats 
Antitrust also presented Haley with glaring examples of bureaucrats 
who could not enforce their orders. The Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
 
 
 16. Haley, supra note 8, at 385–86. 
 17. Id. Like so much of Haley’s work, the point was obvious only after he made it. And as in 
other fields, Haley’s insight has given rise to a rich and sophisticated literature. See, e.g., Curtis J. 
Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law’s Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites in Japan, 34 L. & POL. 
INT’L BUS. 451 (2003); Daniel H. Foote, Forces Driving and Shaping Legal Training Reform in 
Japan, 7 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 215 (2005). 
 18. See Haley, supra note 8, at 365. 
 19. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis 
of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31 (2006). 
 20. John O. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L 
L. & DISP. RESOL. 121, 127, 132, 133 (2002); see also John O. Haley, Law and Culture in China and 
Japan: A Framework for Analysis, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 895 (2006). 
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famously lacks the power of its U.S. peers, but Haley noticed that other 
agencies lacked it, too. In a well-known (to those of us in antitrust) 1980 
case, the Tokyo High Court convicted several oil executives of criminal 
pricefixing.21 The defendants claimed they had fixed the prices only 
because bureaucrats told them to do so.22 The court threw out their 
defense. The bureaucrats lacked the power to make them comply, it 
observed.23 Absent that coercive power, what they may have said made no 
difference. 
Haley quickly realized the implication for conventional claims about 
bureaucratic strength. If his arguments no longer seem novel, it is only 
because (as with those in The Reluctant Litigant) they have won the day. 
In the early 1980s, few claims in Japanese politics were more basic than 
claims about strong bureaucrats. Although closely identified with 
Chalmers Johnson,24 the claims had long constituted conventional wisdom. 
Even Harvard economist and future dean Henry Rosovsky could describe 
Japan as “the only capitalistic country in the world in which the 
government decides how many firms there should be in a given industry, 
and then sets about to arrange the desired number.”25 
To demonstrate how weak bureaucrats were, Haley studied the legal 
framework within which they acted. As he put it: “State actors in Japan 
have generally not had the capacity to develop and direct policy or, more 
importantly, to compel compliance for its implementation typically 
enjoyed by either Japan’s East Asian neighbors or its American and 
European peers.”26 In the end, “[l]egal command and formal coercive 
 
 
 21. Japan v. Idemitsu Kōsan, K.K., 985 HANREI JIHŌ 3, 8 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26, 1980); see 
also John O. Haley, The Oil Cartel Cases: The End of an Era, 15 LAW IN JAPAN 1 (1982). 
 22. Idemitsu Kōsan, 985 HANREI JIHŌ at 17. 
 23. See id. at 34–35. 
 24. See generally CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925–1975 (1982) (discussing the Japanese economic bureaucracy). 
 25. Henry Rosovsky, What Are the ‘Lessons’ of Japanese Economic History?, in ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE LONG RUN 229, 244 (A.J. Youngson ed., 1972). When Haley stressed how little 
bureaucrats could do, he echoed the claims he made about the courts. He similarly claimed judges 
lacked the powers they needed. See generally John O. Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: 
An Essay on Law Without Sanctions, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 265, 266 (1982); JOHN OWEN HALEY, 
AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX (1991) [hereinafter HALEY, 
AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER]; and JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 23 (1998) 
[hereinafter HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW]. If Haley’s bureaucrats were weak, so too were his 
judges sometimes. 
 26. John O. Haley, The Paradox of Weak Power and Strong Authority in the Japanese State, in 
ASIAN STATES: BEYOND THE DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 67, 67 (Richard Boyd & Tak-Wing Ngo 
eds., 2005); see also John Haley, The Context and Content of Regulatory Change in Japan, in THE 
AGE OF REGULATORY REFORM 124, 126 (Kenneth Button & Dennis Swann eds., 1989). 
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power to ensure compliance and conformity with policy objectives” are 
just “rarely available.”27 
Haley’s claim had a variety of dimensions. When scholars 
characterized “administrative guidance” as distinctly Japanese, Haley 
reminded them that bureaucrats regulate informally everywhere: “In all 
countries or cultures, administrative officials generally prefer to enforce 
policy informally. It saves time and effort.”28 When they asserted that 
Japanese bureaucrats determine policy, he replied that “the dominance of 
the Japanese bureaucracy in the political process has been grossly 
exaggerated.”29 When they claimed bureaucrats obtained the results they 
wanted, he found “a consistent pattern of compromise and negotiation . . . 
that can only be characterized as a reflection of failure . . . to achieve their 
original goals. Veiling such failure from view has been the ability of the 
bureaucracy to retract or recast its original demands . . . .”30 And when 
they complained about the lack of procedural controls over bureaucratic 
discretion, he asked, “who cares?” The lack of real bureaucratic power 
“precluded most arbitrary exercises of power” anyway.31 
D. Victim-Offender Reconciliation 
Having noticed how powerless Japanese officials could be, Haley 
asked why the social order stayed so stable.32 Police, prosecutors, and 
judges were few. They had little power. They imposed only modest 
criminal penalties.33 Yet crime stayed scarce. “Why?,” asked Haley. 
To answer the question, Haley focused on what he saw as the 
integrative, “restorative” potential of the Japanese criminal justice system. 
Police, prosecutors, and judges all pushed defendants to confess. They 
encouraged defendants to do what they could to compensate their victims. 
They urged a defendant’s family to take responsibility for his behavior. 
They “actively involve[d] the community in the law enforcement 
 
 
 27. John O. Haley, Japan’s Postwar Civil Service: The Legal Framework, in THE JAPANESE 
CIVIL SERVICE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 77, 78 (Hyung-Ki Kim et al. eds., 1995). 
 28. John O. Haley, Governance by Negotiation: A Reappraisal of Bureaucratic Power in Japan, 
13 J. JAPANESE STUD. 343, 353 (1987). 
 29. Id. at 344.  
 30. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 25, at 158.  
 31. John O. Haley, Administrative Guidance Versus Formal Regulation: Resolving the Paradox 
of Industrial Policy, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 107, 119 (Gary R. 
Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986). 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 121–38; HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW, supra note 25, at 71–89. For 
a fine exploration of some of these criminal issues, see generally Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent 
Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317 (1992). 
 33. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 25, at 121–38. 
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process.”34 Ultimately, argued Haley, they integrated criminals back into 
the social networks they had so forcefully rejected.35 
In all this, Haley did not try to identify a Japan-specific approach. He 
did not explain the low crime rates as a function of anything distinctively 
Japanese. He did not argue that “this is the way Japanese behave.” 
Instead, Haley argued that “this is the way human beings behave.” To 
him, the crime control difference between Japan and the United States lay 
not in different morals, much less in a different “culture.” Instead, it lay in 
a different institutional framework. As he put it, “The moral imperative of 
forgiveness as a response to repentance is surely as much a part of the 
Judeo-Christian heritage as the East Asian tradition . . . . However, 
whatever the reason, unlike Japan, Western societies have failed to 
develop constitutional props for implementing such moral commands.”36  
Having identified what he considered a universal restorative potential, 
Haley forged ties to groups developing similar programs here. He 
published his studies with them.37 They in turn studied his accounts. In the 
process, he brought the study of Japanese law to readers who otherwise 
had ignored the Japanese experience. He did not attract this audience by 
looking to the peculiar in Japan. He attracted it by looking to the universal 
in us all. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Haley entered the world of U.S. studies of Japanese law in the 1970s. 
Three decades later, he had transformed it. In 1970, the field had served 
primarily as a venue for speculation about alternative (and largely 
imaginary) means of social organization. By sheer force of argument and 
example, Haley made it a venue for the rigorous exploration of the effect 
that specific legal rules and institutions could have on real human beings. 
 
 
 34. HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW, supra note 25, at 17. 
 35. Id. 
 36. John O. Haley, Crime Prevention Through Restorative Justice: Lessons from Japan, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 349, 363 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 
1996). 
 37. See John O. Haley, Confession, Repentance and Absolution, in MEDIATION AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: VICTIMS, OFFENDERS AND COMMUNITY 195 (Martin Wright & Burt Galaway eds., 1989); 
John O. Haley, Victim-Offender Mediation: Japanese and American Comparisons, in RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE ON TRIAL: PITFALLS AND POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION: INTERNATIONAL 
RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 105 (Heinz Messner & Hans-Uwe Otto eds., 1992); John O. Haley, Victim-
Offender Mediation: Lessons from the Japanese Experience, 12 MEDIATION Q. 233, 234 (1995); John 
O. Haley, Apology and Pardon: Learning from Japan, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 842, 842 (1998); 
John Owen Haley, Apology and Pardon, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY 77 (David S. 
Clark ed., 2007). 
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In the process, Haley integrated the field into the U.S. legal academy. 
Before Haley, our colleagues used Japan to speculate about cultural 
peculiarity; after him, they discussed human universals. Before Haley, 
they debated how different Japan was from anywhere else; after him, they 
asked what motivated people everywhere. Japan became, as Haley might 
have put it, “Just like any other legal system. And maybe even more so.”  
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